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Healing Psychosocial Trauma in the
Midst of Truth Commissions: The Case
of Gacaca in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Regine U. King
Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto
Post-conflict governments and multilateral organizations have advocated truth
commissions since the end of the Cold War. The mandate of truth commissions
has been to combine the rule of law with psychosocial goals in the hope that they
will break systemic cycles of violence and facilitate reconciliation. While these commissions emphasize the dimensions of truth telling, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation, in practice, they are often challenged to fulfill the mandate of healing
psychosocial traumas through these dimensions in countries that suffer not only
from the traumatic experience of wars and genocide, but also from the multiple
psychosocial issues that result from these forms of mass violence. The present
article examines the psychosocial role of gacaca, a form of truth commission that
was introduced in post-genocide Rwanda in 2002, and argues that relying on
gacaca alone to heal psychosocial trauma in Rwanda underestimates the depth of
suffering that genocide created both at the individual and collective levels in
Rwandan communities. Writing as a Rwandan community-based mental health
researcher and practitioner concerned with the mental well-being of individuals
and communities that survive mass violence and genocide, I suggest that wellassessed models adapted to the issues at hand should be considered to promote
the healing of psychosocial wounds and supplement the work of gacaca in the
rebuilding of peace and reconciliation in the country and in similar contexts elsewhere. Mental well-being is central to the sustainable rebuilding and development
of countries recovering from wars and genocide.
Key words: truth commissions, gacaca, healing psychosocial trauma

Introduction
In a period of only 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi were murdered by their
Hutu neighbors in Rwanda. People were subjected to acts of physical and emotional
cruelty, rape, body mutilation, coerced participation in the murder of loved ones, and
forced mass displacement from their communities. Further, the genocide destroyed
many other aspects of life including the social networks that used to protect Rwandans
in times of adversity. Today, more than a decade later, Rwandans continue to face
multiple serious social issues including poverty, HIV/AIDS, collective trauma, injustices, and interethnic tensions.
In 2002, Rwanda introduced the gacaca program as a form of truth commission
in the attempt to address both the legal and psychosocial consequences of the genocide. Gacaca, which literally means ‘‘grass,’’ was used traditionally as a Rwandan
justice mechanism for dispute resolution to address issues related to property matters,
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inheritance, and family law.1 While the new form of gacaca has received praise for
being a home-grown approach, its ability to meet the psychosocial mandate has
been questioned.
The topic of truth commissions and their workings has been extensively discussed. The purpose of the present article is to expand our understanding of the
healing of psychosocial trauma through the different dimensions of truth commissions in non-Western post-conflict situations and, in particular, the gacaca courts
in Rwanda. Although my aim is to demonstrate the challenges and limitations of
healing psychosocial trauma and offer some suggestions, my critical approach does
not intend to in any way minimize the role gacaca has played in the political and
economic restructuring of the country. Rather, I hope to raise awareness about the
dangers of placing unrealistic expectations on these commissions and assuming that
once they complete their work the affected individuals and communities will be able
to heal their psychosocial wounds. There is no magic bullet to make this happen.
The analysis and information shared in this article are both personal and academic. I am a genocide survivor born and raised in Rwanda. After the genocide, I
worked in the mental health sector in Rwanda before I moved to Canada in 2000. I
have followed the gacaca courts very closely through regular contacts with family,
friends, and colleagues, some of whom were directly involved in the preparation and
execution of the gacaca courts. I have traveled back to Rwanda every year and was
able to hear and read about what was happening in the country. I am a PhD candidate
focusing on community-based mental health research with an interest in alternative
models to individual-based approaches.
Wars and genocide create deep emotional and psychosocial wounds that require
well-examined techniques and skills and an extended period of time, all of which
must extend beyond the limited mandate of truth commissions and gacaca in particular. Psychosocial trauma in post-conflict situations can be understood from a structural
violence framework in that it combines individual emotional wounds with the social
suffering of communities. Psychosocial trauma links feelings about a past traumatic
experience of violence to issues of victimhood, guilt, and fear, which characterize
post-conflict situations.2 It encompasses the struggles of individuals and collectives
for systemic social transformation.3 When these struggles are nationwide and affect
different levels of social structures, a more holistic approach is advised.4 As several
scholars have shown, the immense and extremely complex psychosocial issues observed
in non-Western post-conflict situations extend beyond individual suffering, but there
has been a lack of models addressing individual and collective issues together. The
following section provides more details about healing psychosocial trauma through
truth commissions.

Healing Psychosocial Trauma through Truth Commissions
Wars and genocide result in major social issues—such as extreme poverty, physical
injuries, continued injustice, and violence—that often contribute to the deterioration
of the mental well-being of affected individuals and communities. Despite the staggering effects of mass violence, there has been a scarcity of mental health interventions in many non-Western post-conflict situations, including the Rwandan Genocide.
The few existing interventions have been largely initiated and managed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which operate with limited mandates. These
organizations have also been criticized for applying individual-based models that
are insensitive and inappropriate to the conditions of post-conflict societies.
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Truth commissions have been suggested as an alternative model to address these
gaps through their dual retributive and restorative approach. These commissions are
the most commonly used model of transitional justice that has been advocated by
post-conflict governments and multilateral organizations since the end of the Cold
War.5 The mandate of truth commissions is to combine the rule of law with psychosocial goals in the hope that they will break systemic cycles of violence and facilitate
reconciliation.6 These commissions have been implemented in Latin American and
Eastern European countries and in African countries such as South Africa, Sierra
Leone, and Rwanda. Very recently, Canada also welcomed the truth-commission
approach to deal with the historic violence committed against the Aboriginal peoples
of Canada.
Truth commissions have become a well-established fixture on the global terrain of
human rights,7 which suggests that countries should address past wrongs by acknowledging the pain inflicted upon a group or groups of citizens through brutality and
violence.8 Their dual role to address both legal and psychosocial trauma seemed
ideal in many post-conflict situations. Although they may differ according to the
particular conjunction of the political, cultural, and historical context of each country, they all tend to emphasize the dimensions of truth telling, apology, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. Gacaca shared these concepts with other truth commissions in its
mandate to heal and reunite Rwandans.

Healing Psychosocial Trauma through the Renewed Gacaca
Gacaca was inspired by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South
Africa in its legal and non-legal objectives. When the idea was introduced in Rwandan
communities, both ordinary men and women and local government leaders found the
hybrid nature of gacaca to combine legal and psychosocial objectives through truth
telling, peace, justice, healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation to be very appealing.9
For the first time since the end of genocide, a more familiar concept was brought
to their attention and ordinary Rwandans were asked to play an active role in it.
Rwanda, like other nations that witnessed persistent occurrences of violence, has
been categorized as a distressed and traumatized country alongside its citizens.
Since the end of genocide, many programs were conceptualized and supervised by
international organizations, excluding many Rwandans from the decisions about
the issues that concerned them in the first place. Programs that were initiated by
Rwandans tended to be considered illegitimate by people in positions of power and
international funders.
Many Rwandans were optimistic about the gacaca concept. Both Hutu and Tutsi
had high expectations for it; they hoped it could bring them back together and help
restore relationships. On the one hand, Tutsi survivors wished to know details about
how and where their family members had been killed and who had killed them. They
also wanted to at least have the perpetrators admit what they had done and apologize.
The Hutu also welcomed the gacaca idea and contributed to information gathering
in the hope that the truth would come out, set the innocent free, oblige the guilty to
acknowledge the suffering of the victims, who would offer forgiveness before guaranteeing a reduced sentence to those who confessed.10 Even those in jail expected repentance and forgiveness. Many mental health practitioners like me and some of the
leading scholars in the field in Rwanda, such as Dr. Simon Gasibirege, judged gacaca
to be a promising alternative approach to the imported models that tended to focus
on the individual and ignore the collective nature of psychosocial trauma.
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In various villages in the country, informal gacaca gatherings similar to its
traditional model started taking place for small acts such as looting and destroying
property during the genocide. People were willing to do their part to repair some of
the damage done between neighbors. They collaborated with government workers by
providing information about what had happened during the genocide and participating in the election of the ‘‘inyangamugayo’’—‘‘the righteous’’ or those who were
trusted to play the role of judges during gacaca. I personally participated in these
elections and they seemed to be the most democratic elections I had ever attended.
The candidates stood in front of the voters who lined up behind the candidate of
their choice. Votes were counted and people went home peacefully. A good number
of prisoners started providing information about the whereabouts of the people that
they knew had been killed, and their surviving family members or former neighbors
were able to uncover their remains and bury them with dignity.
Mental health professionals offered input into the mechanisms that they judged
were needed to protect the mental well-being of Rwandans as they entered the process of remembering, recounting, and hearing traumatizing information during the
hearings.11 Potential obstacles, especially the ability of the judges to handle the legal
and moral aspects of gacaca, were critically debated and recommendations about the
actions that could be taken before, during, and after the gacaca hearings were provided.12 The steps that were taken in preparation for the gacaca proceedings seemed
to head in the right direction to heal and reunite Rwandans.
Government officials also had high hopes for gacaca and viewed it as a model by
which to re-establish damaged relationships and unity.13 They wanted gacaca to be a
Rwandan process governed by Rwandans—‘‘a home-grown approach.’’
Although gacaca started as a grassroots approach governed by Rwandans in each
community, it shifted perspectives during its implementation and integrated a new
agenda to meet government demands. Over the course of the seven years since implementation, participation was no longer driven by the excitement and motivation
that characterized the preparatory stage; it became a top-down approach14 and it
faced increased suspicion and safety issues. Survivors who had hoped to share their
suffering and other community members who had agreed to testify feared for their
lives as they started receiving threats and experienced further exclusion. Many genocide suspects who had intended to confess started manipulating facts and evidence,
which often resulted in a further prison sentence that could go up to 25 years. Those
who were released on the condition of compensating the survivors for the material
losses ended up doing community work, called ‘‘Travaux d’Intérêt Généraux’’ (TIG),
which they resented and which did not benefit those who had lost everything to the
genocide.
While the above realities might have benefited the government’s political and
economic restructuring, the gacaca implementation has not offered satisfying results
to the mass Rwandan population or to outside evaluators who criticized gacaca for
its limitations to carry out legal trials and its inability to reconcile Rwandans.
Many of these critiques have often been directed at the Rwandan government and
the model itself. Truth commissions are bound to fail when they are imposed from
above.
In contrast with such criticism, I argue that the whole conceptualization of truth
commissions is flawed in regard to the dual mandate of retribution and restoration.
Inevitable incongruent expectations and weak outcomes result from the lack of
clarity about activities that are organized to fulfill both the retributive and restorative
goals. The lack of contextualization and consideration of the complex realities of the
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countries and communities in which truth commissions are implemented is also
troubling because it can result in more harm than good. The following is an example
of the complex contextual issues that I witnessed first-hand.

First-hand Experience of Gacaca
In the summer of 2007, I decided to attend a gacaca session. Many people I met over
the course of that trip greeted me with statements such as ‘‘Did you know that this
person has been released?’’ or ‘‘Today is a gacaca day and you cannot do anything
today, you go to the hearings, or do nothing else.’’ Once a week in every village, all
work stopped so that all citizens can concentrate on the local gacaca hearings. The
sense of urgency and concern in what I was hearing urged me to take part in what
was happening. In order to gain a better understanding of these proceedings, I
decided to attend gacaca in my home village. The community members had gathered
in different neighborhood-based groups in various cells. After a long period dedicated
to paperwork preparation and registration to ascertain who was present at the
session, the villagers were instructed to sit in a circle in front of four judges to
facilitate the process. Like in other communities, these judges had been elected by
their fellow community members. A group of suspected perpetrators stood nearby.
Some of them were prisoners dressed in pink uniforms and others were community
members who had been listed as suspects but were still living in their respective
communities.
The hearing on that day focused on four men accused of attacking the home of
a woman of about 75 years of age at the time of the hearings. She had lost her
husband and seven of her ten children. It was shocking to hear that one of her
surviving children from a previous relationship with a Hutu man was among the
accused. During the session, each of the accused men was asked to give a personal
account of his role in what had happened to the woman. Their statements were
more of a form of self-defense than a testimony. A few individual witnesses were
then asked to either confirm or disconfirm the alleged facts. The elderly woman was
among the witnesses and she seemed disoriented when judges asked her to focus on
facts and not tell her story as she understood it. Although nobody seemed to deny
what had happened to her and her family, there were problems in explaining how it
had happened and who should be held responsible. For more than four hours, the
community members witnessed the hearing in silence, moving their eyes back and
forth between the accused and the witnesses. This sense of hopelessness was troubling
because in other situations people do not stand by and watch emotionlessly; they do
something about it. When I lived in Rwanda, some neighbors who wronged my family
and felt guilty about what they had done expressed remorse in various ways (for
example, by offering to help on the land, offering small gifts at a wedding, or returning stolen furniture). These cultural gestures offered a window for communication
and they made us not feel so alone after the genocide. Other than a few survivors
who guided the elderly woman from one group of defendants to the next and under
the order of the judges, nothing else moved. Was the genocide experience being
relived? Was this a conspiracy to silence or was it a silenced community in the face
of the legality that tends to dominate social processes such as gacaca? Or was it
dissociation from the agony felt around this community? This silent witnessing can
be interpreted in different ways. As a Rwandan interested in the participatory and
dynamic action of individuals and collectives for their healing, on that day, I witnessed
a disciplined community rather than an active group of excited participants.
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This experience seemed to reflect the many stories I have heard from Rwandan
women who confided in me that they were unable to bring up the issues that troubled
them the most, such as rape, at these gacaca hearings. They were not allowed to say
anything related to rape because doing so could lead the rapist génocidaire back to
prison and in turn be considered as a crime committed by these women. Further,
they did not see any support from the judges or other community members. This
may explain the prevalence of many traumatic crises, suicidal attempts, and even
occasional uncontrollable threatening statements during gacaca sessions instead of
dialogical expressions. Silence is very damaging, especially for those whose suffering
is not given value.
Scholars who examined the psychosocial aspects of truth commissions argue that
gacaca did not result in positive outcomes,15 partly because of the top-down approach
that the government adopted halfway through the hearings. Phil Clark, who spent
an extensive period of time in Rwanda observing and recording the gacaca proceedings, offers evidence that the Rwandan government closely controlled the functioning
of due process to the point of having officials intervene to correct the judges’ statements, halt disruptive behavior in the general assembly, or interpret back to the
participants what the testimonies meant.16 Although Clark judges that such actions
were not generalizable, he acknowledges the impact that these interferences had on
the desired open space in which dialogue was needed to enhance non-legal ends—the
psychosocial goals of gacaca.
A close examination of truth commissions reveals that gacaca is not alone in the
struggle to meet psychosocial needs. As the analysis of the different dimensions
advocated by truth commissions will show, the inhibition of the psychosocial component is a commonly shared concern except in places where the locally initiated
approaches assumed the risk of not seeking legitimacy from the top social structures
of society (e.g., the Peruvian integration of the Senderistas in the Ayacucho region).17
To me, these concerns reside in the whole conceptualization of truth commissions,
which combines retributive and restorative justice and fails to critically consider the
meaning and implications of each dimension in the work of truth commissions.
In the following section I pay particular attention to these dimensions, including
truth telling, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Accountability, public acknowledgment, and apology are all forms of recognizing the wrong done and promising to
not repeat past mistakes. I use apology as the term most commonly used in truth
commissions. Reconciliation will not be examined as a separate concept because the
other dimensions are part of the reconciliation process.

Truth Telling
Truth commissions have considered truth telling to be an important dimension of
addressing the legal issues and psychosocial trauma that result from mass violence. With a concentration on truth telling, Alex Boraine postulates that the telling
of stories about dehumanizing acts can be publicly received with dignity when
relayed in a poignant manner.18 He also asserts that truth commissions challenge
people who deliberately ignore the suffering inflicted on others to stop saying that
they did not know.19 Instead, they are offered the opportunity to cooperate with survivors who are seeking the truth about what happened to their loved ones. Cathartic
reactions to testimonies are thought to facilitate the transition from a wounded to
a healed individual; the effects of the testimonies presumably impact those who do
not have a chance to testify. Truth telling is also believed to consist of narratives
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or expressions of a collectively shared understanding of the past gained from individuals’ different levels of witnessing.20 However, Mendeloff argues that truth telling
through testimonies is very hard to prove empirically because it is subjective; human
beings always remember and relate stories from a spatially and temporally limited
perspective.21
From a political point of view, truth telling is a tool to break the cycle of silence
surrounding mass violence so that people cannot claim ignorance.22 Pumla GobodoMadikizela argues that these commissions allow for a reflection on one’s own role in
the past and the capacity to confront and acknowledge the wrong done and, in turn,
this should lead to reaching out to others in the attempt to repair broken relationships. Using the example of South Africa, she explains that the TRC created a space
for people to come together to forge a peaceful society by sharing their pain, grief,
anger, and resentment, emotions that are associated with a history of violence in a
reflective dialogue. She adds that the public spaces open to the TRC hearings were
sufficiently intimate to allow some acts of recognition, apology, and forgiveness.23
Michael Humphrey, on the contrary, finds troubling the adoption of psychoanalytic
language which proposes that revealing is healing and that unresolved memory of
past violence can be overcome by remembering, telling, and forgetting.24
According to my observations from gacaca and the anecdotal stories heard from
people who have participated in it, telling and listening to testimonies was not done
as a form of dialogue because it did not engage the community participants who
witnessed in silence. It seemed to me that the environment was actually unsafe for
those testifying and the defendants who had to prove their innocence in regard to the
accusations made against them. When offering testimonies or defensive replies, the
accused and the offended addressed the judges who had the ultimate power to decide
the outcome of the proceedings.
Researchers who followed gacaca hearings in Rwanda and had opportunities to
interview some of its participants reported that actually telling or giving testimony
during the gacaca hearings had a negative impact on the psychological well-being of
those involved. In a study conducted on gacaca, Katherine Brounéus demonstrates
that survivors who testified in the gacaca were 20% and 40% more likely to suffer
from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), respectively, than survivors who had not done so. Among the inyangamugayo (the judges) or neighbors,
the effect of bearing witness emerged even more strongly as the relative risks of
suffering from depression and PTSD, respectively, were 60% and 75% higher among
those who had testified in the gacaca compared to those who had not.25 Participants
also reported feelings of greater insecurity and fear after testifying as well as physical
and other psychological difficulties immediately before, during, and after their testimonies, including shaking uncontrollably, fainting, and intense feelings of isolation.26
Studies on emotions such as shame and guilt have shown high patterns of unique
relationships between emotions and motivations when participants were asked to
recall ‘‘other-caused events,’’ whereas feelings of anger, sadness, and anxiety were
closely interrelated with the ‘‘self-caused event.’’ 27 Similarly, in a case study concentrating on one particular community Max Rettig found that the healing aspect of
truth telling was rather questionable as participants gave false testimonies to seek
revenge for grievances related or unrelated to genocide. Rettig showed, for instance,
that some community members wrongfully accused others as a result of marital
affairs or land-based conflicts while others did it to avoid severe punishment or
threats.28 Of the three elements of truth telling, truth hearing, and truth shaping,

140

Healing Psychosocial Trauma

Clark found truth telling to be the most problematic. Suspects and their allies told
lies to protect themselves or their loved ones, simply hid evidence, or went even
further to threaten survivors to not tell what they knew.29 Yet, there were no counselors available to support those who experienced emotional distress resulting from
the gacaca hearings.

Apology
Apology is another concept that has been greatly emphasized in truth commissions
as the morally ‘‘right thing to do.’’ It consists of acknowledging injustice, expressing
regret, and accepting responsibility, including material or financial compensation.
Sincere apology is a critical factor in restoring broken relationships.30 According to
Allan el al., genuine apology should go beyond general verbal apologies to incorporate
apologetic behavior that reflects the wrongdoers’ degree of sincerity as the victims
perceive it.31 For full-fledged completion, a genuine apology must elicit acceptable
signs of empathy on the part of the offended party.32 In the form of accountability,
apology can range from sincere acknowledgment of the wrong done and expression
of regret to material or monetary compensation or other forms of punishment, such
as imprisonment.
While truth commissions place a great deal of emphasis on the process of apology,
this concept has often been discouraged by a legal system in which offenders manipulate or deny facts in order to avoid any form of accountability. Concentrating on
factual truth and other simple forms of public acknowledgment and reluctantly
incorporating apologetic measures hinders the very nature of what apology means
in a healing sense.33
In places like Peru, where the unrest is rooted in decades of animosity, compensation has been considered unreasonable.34 In other countries where truth commissions recognize the importance of material compensation, financial compensation
is seldom provided as a form of recognition of the injustice and pain inflicted on the
victims, with a common excuse of insufficient funds. In places where mass violence
was sponsored by the state, financial apology is seen as the responsibility of the
government (e.g., South Africa).
In gacaca courts, however, compensation has been a burden on individual offenders
rather than the state. Because of the poverty of many of the frontline killers, individuals who cannot afford monetary compensation do community work, known as TIG,
such as repair of the roads or other tasks related to the public interest and not to the
individual victims, many of whom also live in extreme poverty. This approach has
left both the victims and the perpetrators dissatisfied by the outcomes of gacaca,
thereby creating the perception of another form of injustice. While community work
is good for all, survivors resent the fact that the government has done very little to
help them rebuild their lives and the houses that were destroyed during the genocide. At the same time, the accused resent and blame the victims for what they
view as exploitative punishment. In this context, the process of apology becomes
overwhelmed by emotions of fear, anger, and resentment, and has little social space
to offer sincere apology and forgiveness.
Within the context of healing emotional wounds, the process of apology entails
emotional work on the part of the different parties in the conflict, who must cope
with guilt, shame, anger, and pity.35 The manner in which apology is expressed
influences the nature of the response offered by the injured party. There is a lack
of empirical studies on the process of apology in the context of truth commissions.
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However, studies done on the concept of apology in social contexts other than truth
commissions show that when offenders deny their offense and try to justify their
wrongdoing—or ignore, avoid, or exclude the offended—they develop instances of
active or passive dissociation36 or disengagement. These attitudes may indicate
a lack of accountability on the part of the perpetrators which, in turn, can evoke
more negative reactions from the offended and augment threats to attempts at reestablishing peace.
Although many truth commissions are theoretically supposed to enhance apologetic
statements, they do not offer the necessary circumstances for emotions to be expressed and processed so that genuine apology can take place. Rather, commissions
often focus on testimonies, especially the perpetrators’ accounts, to provide facts of
the mass violence that occurred and not on the intense climate that testifying may
create. Kanyangara et al.’s assessment of the emotional climate and intergroup perceptions involving a group of survivors and prisoners accused of genocide crimes
in Rwanda showed that gacaca hearings heightened negative perceptions which
then prevailed for an extended period of time.37 Emotions of sadness, fear, disgust,
insecurity, and shame increased during the course of the hearings, especially for
survivors. Prisoners who accepted their role in the genocide during gacaca hearings
reported feeling an intensified sense of guilt.
Granting the perpetrators amnesty when their testimonies match the evidence
sought by the commissioners has also posed problems and raised questions about
whose justice is being sought. The amnesties are often detached from remorse for
the violation of victims’ rights. Nevertheless, the victims of violence are required to
accept the amnesty, which creates another obstacle on the journey toward forgiveness and hinders opportunities to obtain the desired psychosocial relief and benefits.
Research shows that people who go through formalistic processes of apology such
as amnesty or insincere apology may later regret having apologized or experience anger
and protest their innocence by blaming the victims for the violence that occurred.38
Genuine apology constitutes an important foundation for forgiveness39 and a twoway emotional process of giving and receiving. The presumed offenders feel relieved
when they are able to express their regrets and shame about the wrong done, and
the offended similarly experience relief from the pain endured when their offenders
genuinely admit the wrong done. Unfortunately, this mutual communion of pain
and emotion that transforms the affected individuals into renewed individuals who
can in turn share the gift of forgiveness is missing from many truth commissions
including the gacaca courts.

Forgiveness
The topic of forgiveness has also been adopted as a dimension of truth commissions.
Forgiveness and reconciliation, like truth telling and apology, are interpreted differently
according to different disciplines such as theology and some branches of psychology,
including social psychology and, more recently, peace psychology. From a psychosocial perspective, the concept of authentic forgiveness is embedded in inner and
outer factors. In this section, I examine the factors that influence forgiveness both
at the individual (inner) and external (outer) levels.
At the individual level, research identifies narcissism as a major intrinsic factor
that hinders forgiveness and psychosocial well-being.40 Narcissistic individuals tend
to concentrate their efforts on the self and self-interests. They are easily offended
and often preoccupied with defending their rights and requiring legal justice to be
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rendered after harmful events. For the narcissists, transgression is a debt that must
be paid and forgiveness is costly and morally unacceptable. Their unforgiving nature
can lead to anger, anxiety, and other negative emotions, especially when society suggests acts of forgiveness after painful experiences. The interpersonal and psychological anxiety observed in narcissistic individuals tends to be negatively correlated with
social connectedness41 and tends to make the narcissists prone to mental health
issues.
At the external level, factors that influence forgiveness include sociocultural and
political variables. One of the conditions of belonging to a certain group is to accept
group behaviors and attitudes that separate. In-group and out-group categorizations
consist of showing favoritism toward group members and denigrating members of
the out-group.42 In such a context, forgiving someone from an opposing group can
threaten in-group cohesion or the individual right to choice. Studies of in-group and
out-group relations find the process of forgiveness to be influenced by the level of
regard in-group members have for out-group members. Stangor et al., in fact, showed
that belonging to a group with high negative attitudes toward members of the outgroup hinders the willingness to forgive.43
In the case of post-conflict situations, these categorizations are understood differently. When mass violence is conceptualized as a general human tragedy, people are
more forgiving and less inclined to assign collective guilt to the opposing group.44 A
recent study conducted by Cehajic et al. with high school and university students
in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that when students identified themselves as
Bosnian they showed reduced social distance from the out-group, greater tendency
toward forgiveness, and increased trust in the other group in conflict.45 In contrast,
other studies found that competitive victimhood and a high level of in-group identification discourage the forgiveness of members of the out-group, especially when
in-group membership has links with political membership.46
An empirical understanding of forgiveness is crucial to psychosocial healing in
the work of truth commissions. However, this dimension tends to take a legal or
theological approach without considering the psychological needs of those who are
involved and the complexity of the issues at hand. For instance, although forgiveness
is said to be a part of the work of truth commissions, it is often excluded from the
planned activities of truth commissions. When it is used, it is driven by motives and
outcomes other than that of healing emotional wounds. Chapman’s study on the TRC
showed that some people participated in the hearing because they wished to discover
the truth about human rights violations and the perpetrators. Others testified to tell
their stories, gain public acknowledgment, or have their names cleared.47 Clark, in his
multiple interviews in Rwanda about gacaca, found that forgiveness was often performed through public confessions that involved the accused and the public prosecutor representing the state rather than the opposed parties in the conflict.48 While
these types of apology are often viewed as symbolic, their genuineness is questionable when there is no dialogue between those involved in the process.
Gacaca encouraged people to reconsider their situations and role in the genocide
and the process itself. Some may even have attended after going through a personal
process in the attempt to overcome the hurt. However, these initiatives seem to have
been dashed when offenders did not come forward to tell the truth and apologize. My
brother, who was severely cut with machetes several times, attended a session in
which the person responsible for his attack was being tried. When I asked him
what it was like to stand face-to-face with a man who left him for dead, he told me
the following:
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Before I went to the gacaca, I traced the journey I took on the day I was attacked.
Then I identified two people I needed to forgive if they accepted to receive my forgiveness: the woman who shouted when I tried to hide behind her hut, and the man who
attacked me first with his machete. . . . [T]he woman came forward and kneeled down
to apologize again and again. But the man lied and then did not make any effort to
acknowledge what he did to me. I forgave the woman and took back my forgiveness
from the man when he failed to express remorse.

Some people might have the ability to juxtapose positive emotions with the negative
emotions associated with the offense, move past their negative emotions, and even
establish peaceful coexistence with their offenders. This kind of forgiveness, however,
is very fragile because the root problem of disagreement remains untouched. This
kind of forgiveness does not provide a good foundation on which to rebuild strong
relationships, and feelings of animosity can be easily revived toward self or others
when there is no opportunity to hear how the damage done affects the lives of people
in a conflict.
Other people use religious forgiveness to obtain peace, especially when forgiveness
is motivated by the ‘‘forgive and forget’’ idea and when violence is committed by
members of the same community. When forgiveness becomes imposed as a requirement for maintaining peaceful coexistence and fails to repair broken relationships
between the offender and the offended, it lends to the fragile state of peace, in opposition to true forgiveness which allows negative emotions—such as anger, resentment, the desire for revenge, and other negative emotions toward the offender—to
be released.49 True forgiveness goes beyond the exoneration of the out-group from
past injuries with the expectation that direct engagement with the out-group and
reconciliatory processes will follow.50
It is well known that in many divided societies people form new social categories
based on shared experiences and other types of in-group identification such as
ethnicity, race, or gender. The question to ask is whether truth commissions, in their
mandate to facilitate forgiveness, try to minimize this divide between in-group and
out-group membership. In many countries where truth commissions have been promoted there is a great emphasis on victims and perpetrators as two opposing groups
in the conflict. This black and white dichotomy is problematic at times when the
perpetrator in one incident becomes the victim in the other. To recall the elderly
woman I mentioned earlier, her son who committed genocide was also a brother to
the half siblings who were killed in the genocide. In situations such as this one, the
hurt can be very deep and the accusations and defensive testimonies can complicate
the gacaca process and cause further psychosocial problems.
The exploration of each of the above dimensions provides a theoretical and empirical understanding of the dimensions and the challenges they pose to the conceptualization and implementation of truth commissions. The lack of critical consideration
of these dimensions has moral causes that are often ignored in the analysis of the truth
commissions. These include false promises and a lack of concern about the impact of
truth commissions on the psychosocial well-being of individuals and communities.

False Promises
False promises involve, simply put, promising things that truth commissions are unable to achieve. This practice is notable in the combination of retributive and restorative justice models—two approaches rooted in dichotomous philosophical frameworks. Retributive justice, rooted in legal justice and supported by the liberal
human rights tradition, is not an equalizing discourse. Although this approach seeks
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to punish the offender and vindicate the victim,51 it does not always offer opportunities
to explore the problems that caused violence or the resulting complex issues, such as
psychosocial trauma. Restorative justice, on the other hand, originates from moral
and religious discourse52 and encourages the restoration of relationships and involves
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation between individuals and groups.
The combination of opposing perspectives in one intervention model has been
considered a political strategy to manage post-conflict societies but is unsatisfying
at the psychosocial level. In fact, in theory, truth commissions seem to lean toward
a restorative approach. However, in practical terms, balancing retributive justice
with restorative and reconciliation processes has been a struggle.
During the proceedings, gacaca became more retributive than restorative, and
the collected facts were used to prosecute the wrongdoers rather than restore relationships through the processes of apology and forgiveness. Anecdotal reports about
gacaca reveal that the complicated cases that lasted more than one session were
often cases that presented complex legal challenges and not reconciliatory processes.
While the initial preparatory activities tended to emphasize the restorative approach, gacaca was transformed over the course of its implementation into a topdown approach charged to meet the mandate of the state and not of the people.
Consequently, it fell into the trap of state-driven goals imposed from above, which
is common in many truth commissions.53
At the beginning, gacaca was praised for being unique in that it countered the
top-down approach by involving the local population in electing their own judges,
actively participating in the collection of facts, and testifying during the proceedings.54 Both Hutu and Tutsi were chosen as judges. While people tend to think that
the implementation did not go so well, the conceptualization of gacaca also presented
initial contradictions about what it ought to achieve and how it ought to do so.
For instance, the collection of facts was not as truthful as expected.55 The accused
frequently gave evasive testimonies in order to cover up their own deeds or those of
family members by admitting to minor crimes while attributing more serious violent
acts to those who had died or disappeared. At the government level, the collection of
facts about past wrongs contradicted the information that had been used to motivate
people to participate in gacaca. The written objectives of this form of truth commission emphasized prosecution,56 whereas people were told that it was reconciliation
that was being sought. These conceptual and practical contradictions are a reflection
of the moral issues related to the whole process. It is of no surprise that those
involved both locally and nationally said they were doing one thing while actually
doing exactly the opposite of what was expected.

Caring Less about Re-traumatization
Asking people to relive traumatic experiences without adequate and appropriate support in place and trying to achieve on the social level what the psychological models
attempt to accomplish on an individual level might actually be more traumatizing
than healing.57 The TRC, which is upheld as a role model for other truth commissions, has itself been criticized for underestimating the extent of the psychological
impact of public testimonies of the acts of violence committed during the apartheid
regime in South Africa.58 According to Allan, the initial draft of the TRC did not
have a plan to support witnesses who had to relive their traumatic past through testimonies.59 Even when the testimonies were recognized as potentially re-traumatizing
and psychologists were invited to help, the support was restricted to individuals who
had given testimonies and not those who heard them. In actuality, testimonies of
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mass violence can be traumatic for both the witnesses and the public who follow
these unfolding stories in silence.
These testimonies can even have dramatic effects when the facilitators of the
process, and judges in the case of gacaca, lack facilitation skills for complex and
traumatizing processes (e.g., traumatic crises). In Rwanda, the elected judges received
basic training in legal prosecution and not in healing processes and mediating complex
cases. While this kind of training was in many ways insufficient and inadequate, it
did not prevent the judges from making legal decisions that took precedence over
the reconciliatory goals that the gacaca initiatives aimed to accomplish. Anecdotal
evaluations of this process by older Rwandans who understood the difference between the old and new gacaca found the new one to be an instrument of the state
influenced by international donors. Rather than a psychosocial grassroots intervention, gacaca, like many other truth commissions, became what Teitel calls ‘‘a
bureaucratic response to bureaucratic murder’’ 60 that is driven by political and
economic restructuring and governance.
In old gacaca, the neutral and respected members of the community who were
invited to resolve a particular issue met at the scene where the wrong had been
done. The process included hearing the explanations of the parties involved in the
conflict, collecting factual evidence from observation, and hearing the testimony of
witnesses. Rather than imposing punishment, the two parties were given an opportunity to express their feelings and needs, and through a negotiation process they
agreed on compensation for the wrong done. Other community members were not
silent witnesses. They participated in the discussions and even helped negotiate the
compensation. If the offender did not have the means to compensate the victim for
the wrong done, other members offered some assistance. Assessment of the wrong
done was always followed by a recognition of responsibility and an apology. The
process was accompanied by rituals of shaking hands and sharing a drink which
was purchased by both parties and sometimes other community members. The restoration of the broken relationship was an important outcome of this old grassroots
form of gacaca. The involvement of the community in the process was a sign of
solidarity. The old gacaca model resembles other grassroot approaches observed in
post-conflict countries, such as Peru,61 and East Timor’s village-based Community
Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs).62 Although these approaches tend to apply methodologies that bring local people together to challenge individual-based models and use
sociocultural resources to repair the damage done, they often lack legitimacy and the
methods they propose often remain understudied. The following section offers some
suggestions on how psychosocial healing can be approached through an emphasis on
grassroot-based truth commissions.

Suggestions for Healing Psychosocial Trauma through Truth
Commissions and Gacaca
The action of remembering and telling stories of violence is necessary to stop the
cycles of violence that threaten livelihood in post-conflict societies. Breaking the
silence that surrounds mass violence through public testimonies is important both
politically and socially. Truth commissions can continue to offer an alternative to
individual legal and psychological approaches. The collection of stories of violence
and the use of case presentations as a way to recognize the pain inflicted and the
failure of the state to protect its citizens should be encouraged for public acknowledgment. However, the institution in charge of truth commissions in each country
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should focus on the needs of the people and determine what actions must be taken
based on the results of assessments. This would limit unrealistic expectations and
false hopes and allow the process to build on the local resources that can remain in
place once the commissions complete their work.
Local governments and external supporters have the responsibility to ensure
security and the rule of law and to acknowledge the impact of mass violence on the
psychosocial well-being of individuals and their communities. Local people should be
identified as key players in the healing of their own trauma and the rebuilding of
their communities. Affected individuals need to be aware of the suffering of other
community members on all sides of a conflict. The depth and extent of healing will
depend to a high degree on the willingness of individuals to mobilize other community members and share resources through social and psychological group processes.
Initiating a truth commission managed by local citizens does not mean the local
citizens in charge (i.e., judges elected for gacaca courts) need training only in legal
matters, which tended to be the case in Rwanda. I suggest that the individuals
trusted to be fair in their judgment should also receive other kinds of training that
empower them to do their job right. One of the issues with which truth commissions
have experienced difficulties is the ability to address the different forms of violence
embedded in different levels of social structures. One way to address these forms of
violence would be to encourage local people to identify equalizing coping mechanisms
and rituals that extend beyond the borders of existing social categorizations. As
explained above, in traditional gacaca some rituals were more restorative than the
judgment itself. However, the renewed gacaca has tended to focus on what divides
people rather than on what unites them. Rituals can facilitate the creation of the
space needed for breaking the silence that paralyzes those whose identities have
been violated and can enhance psychosocial healing.

Conclusion
In this article, I discussed the different dimensions that demonstrate the lack of
careful conceptualization of truth commissions and gacaca in particular. Although
some of these dimensions involve legal and psychosocial aspects (e.g., truth telling
and different forms of accountability), each of them should be well-studied in terms
of its legal and psychosocial aspects and within the context of the concerned postconflict society in order to set up appropriate and achievable objectives. The process
of their implementation should also be carefully scrutinized and it should build on
existing resources and mechanisms. For instance, some people had managed to settle
some of the conflicts related to the genocide event by telling the truth about what
happened, compensating according to one’s means, and even repairing some broken
relationships. The implementation of gacaca in each region should have used these
instances as examples to encourage other community members to do the same.
On a concluding note, the healing of psychosocial trauma cannot start and finish
with truth commissions or other imposed models.63 The different dimensions of truth
commissions can help bring about justice and heal psychosocial trauma if carefully
conceptualized and implemented. The active involvement of the local people and the
use of local resources are crucial to the achievement of healing psychosocial trauma
in post-conflict situations and post-genocide Rwanda. The creation of a contained
space, the use of local unifying rituals that are oriented toward social justice, and
good facilitation skills can help manage the overwhelming emotions and change
affected communities from broken and divided ones into healing communities.
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